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Out-migration and attrition of physicians and dentists 
before and after EU accession (2003 and 2011).  
The case of Hungary. 
 
Júlia Varga  
 
Abstract 
 
This paper employs a large-scale, individual-level, panel dataset to analyse the effect of EU 
accession on the probability of out-migration on the part of Hungarian physicians and 
dentists between 2003 and 2011. The study uses event history modelling and competing risk 
models. The results show that EU accession did not at the time affect the probability of the 
out-migration on the part of Hungarian medical doctors, while after the end of the 
transitional period  of restrictions on the free movement of labour from the new EU member 
states to Austria and Germany (May 2011), the probability of doctors’ migration increased 
considerably, as  it did (for other reasons) starting in the spring of 2010. We also found that 
more than half of those medical doctors who left the country during the observation period 
returned sometime later. Results also show that in Hungary, in addition to migration, the 
attrition of doctors’ numbers is also a severe problem. It seems that shortages of healthcare 
professionals are not only due to high outward migration but may also be attributed to other 
problems in the Hungarian health system. Nevertheless, outward migration plays an 
important and growing role in the phenomenon. 
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Hova lettek az orvosok? Az orvosok külföldre vándorlása 
és pályaelhagyása Magyarországon 2003-2011 
 
Varga Júlia 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
A tanulmány nagymintás, egyéni, panel adatokra alapozva azt vizsgálja, hogy hogyan 
változott a magyarországi orvosok külföldre vándorlásának, és egyéb okból történt 
pályaelhagyásának valószínűsége a 2003 és 2011 közötti időszakban. Az eseménytörténeti 
elemzés, versengő kockázati modellek eredményei azt mutatják, hogy közvetlenül  az EU 
csatlakozást követően nem változott a magyar orvosok külföldre vándorlásának 
valószínűsége.  2010 tavaszától, majd  az osztrák és német munkavállalási korlátozások 
feloldása után felgyorsult az orvosok migrációja. A tanulmány azt is bemutatja, hogy a 
megfigyelési időszakban elvándorolt orvosok több mint fele visszatért Magyarorságra a 
megfigyelési periódusban. Az eredmények arra is felhívják a figyelmet, hogy Magyarországon 
az orvosok külföldre vándorlása mellett ugyanolyan súlyú probléma a belföldi pályaelhagyás 
is, tehát az, hogy az orvosok itthon helyezkednek el más állásban.  
 
Tárgyszavak: orvosi migráció, orvosi pályaelhagyás, versengő kockázati modell 
 
JEL kódok: C41, C55, I10, J4, J40, J45, J60, J61 
 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study is to analyse how EU accession has affected medical doctors’ out-
migration. The migration of physicians from countries is the object of increasing attention in 
many European countries because of its impact on shortages of medical doctors; European 
countries are facing health workforce shortages. Demand for medical doctors continues to 
grow faster than supply for various reasons: the population is ageing, which increases 
demand; the use of new medical technology also tends to add to this increase in demand; 
and so does the growing specialisation in health services. Furthermore, the increasing 
pressure of work results in staff leaving employment for less stressful types of jobs, and in 
some countries few people train as health professionals, etc. The European Commission 
predicts that the EU will face a shortage of 230,000 physicians and a further shortage of 
150,000 dentists, pharmacists and physiotherapists by 2020 if existing workforce problems 
are not addressed (European Commission, 2012). 
All EU member states are losing medical doctors, not only the Central and Eastern 
European new member states (EU-10
1
), but also the EU-15
2
 countries. However, unlike the 
EU-10 countries, many EU-15 countries are the destination of migration by health 
professionals from other nations (Bidwell  et al., 2013; Ognyanova- Busse, 2011; Kopetsch,  
2008, Dussault et al. 2009; Scharer-Freitag, 2015; Filippidis, 2015). As the EU-10 countries 
are currently not competitive with the old EU member states in terms of wages, working 
conditions and career prospects, EU accession amplified fears in the Central and Eastern 
European new member states that accession may facilitate the movement of physicians from 
these countries to other parts of the Union, and that out-migration could intensify shortages 
of doctors in these countries. 
Several projects (MoHProf
3
, PROMeTHEUS
4
) and studies (e.g. Buchan et al., 2014; 
Dussault et al. 2009; Vujicic and Zurn, 2006; Jinks et al., 2000, Wismar et al. 2011; 
Costigliola 2011) have examined the migration of medical doctors in Europe. These studies 
concluded that post-accession outflows from the Central and Eastern European new member 
states have been lower than expected, but they also found that more recent data show some 
increase in outward migration (Eurofound, 2013). Nevertheless, most of these studies 
                                                 
1 EU-10 countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, Slovakia. 
2EU-15 countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Austria, Finland, Sweden.. 
3MoHProf reviewed the trends in international migration of health workers in 25 countries around the 
world, with a focus on migration within, to and from the EU (Tjadens and Weilandt, 2012). 
4PROMeTHEUS, looked at health professional mobility and health systems of 17 countries in Europe 
(Wismar et al., 2011). 
  
emphasise that there is a lack of reliable data on out-migration. In most countries, the only 
data source available to estimate outflows is ‘intention-to-leave’ data, that is, the number of 
applications for certificates of recognition of diplomas or survey data asking about medical 
doctors’ intention to work abroad. These data have limited reliability in relation to the 
movement trends of doctors because not everyone who applies for certificates or who is 
planning to leave their home country actually leaves. Also, individuals may apply more than 
once, leading to overestimates of actual flows. Furthermore, not all countries systematically 
request these certificates, and this may result in the underestimation of migration (Wismar 
et al., 2011; Mullan, 2005; Docquier-Bhargava, 2007). In addition to the difficulties of the 
measurement of outward migration, we know far less about how return migration has 
changed. The few studies that have investigated return migration used survey data to assess 
the magnitude of it (e.g. Williams-Baláz, 2008). 
Our research explores a unique, large-scale, individual-level, panel data set that allows us 
to follow out-migration, attrition and other employment status changes of Hungarian 
medical doctors at the individual level on a monthly basis between 2003 and 2011. This 
study may supplement previous research as it analyzed actual changes in out-migration and 
employment status of medical doctors. In addition, our sample also made the observation of 
the return migration of physicians during the observation period possible. The paper further 
provides estimations on how the probability of return migration has changed between 2003 
and 2011. 
2. DATA 
 
The base data set is a large, merged, longitudinal dataset covering 50 percent of Hungary’s 
population aged 5-73 in 2003. The data contains information from registers of the Pension 
Directorate, the Tax Office, the Health Insurance Fund, the Public Employment Service and 
the Office of Education. From this source sample, a medical doctors’ subsample was created. 
All individuals were included in the medical doctors’ subsample whose occupation code was 
“medical doctor, general practitioner”, “medical doctor, specialist doctor”  or “medical 
doctor, dentist” according to the Hungarian Occupational Classification system for at least 
one month between January 2003 and December 2011. Each datum in the sample is 
followed until December 2011 or exit from the social security system (for reasons of death or 
permanent emigration). The maximum number of observations for one individual is 108 
months.  The unit of observation is the monthly status of individuals. 
Our data contains information month by month on the labour market status of the 
individual; whether the individual was working for the given month in Hungary; if so, what 
  
his/her occupation  code was; also the question of whether the person was studying, in 
receipt of benefits such as old-age pension, disability benefit, or child care allowance and 
social security benefits, unemployment insurance benefit, or unemployment assistance. We 
also have data on demographics (date of birth, gender), the region of residence and the 
labour income of the individual. The income from employment contains any informal 
payments the individual doctor listed in their tax statement. The use of informal health 
payments or “thank-you money” to gain access to health care is widespread in Hungary, as in 
most Eastern European countries (e.g., Lewis (2007), Köllő (2014). Although doctors have to 
declare informal payments in their tax statements, tax evasion is also widespread, and most 
tax statements include only a part of the real amount of such payments. We could not 
address the problem of this hidden income in this study. 
We have data for 18,266 individuals. The number of working doctors varied between 
9594 and 11415 persons in the different observed months, and of these, 2933-3331 were 
general practitioners, 5462-6899 specialist doctors, and 1024-1469 dentists. (Summary 
statistics for the variables used in estimation are presented in Annex 1 Table A1). There are 
some biases in the sample. First, as we do not have data on medical graduates who have 
never worked in the Hungarian health system, they are not included in the sample. Other 
data on medical graduates indicates high outward migration for graduates. For example, 
about 40% of those who finished their studies between 2007 and 2010 have not yet 
registered in the system (Jávorszkyné Nagy, 2012). As we could not include medical 
graduates in our analysis, our results give a lower bound estimate on the out-migration of 
Hungarian doctors. Secondly, we could not identify those individuals as medical doctors who 
worked in managerial positions in the health sector for the whole observation period, 
because they did not have a “medical doctor” occupation code at any time, so we could not 
determine whether they were medical doctors. 
With the help of the detailed information on labour market status and other data 
concerning the individuals, five status groups could be distinguished: (1) those working as a 
physician or dentist in Hungary, (2) out-migrated, (3) exited the profession (attrition), (4) 
exited employment (related to inactivity, unemployment),  or (5)  died. We used the 
following scheme to classify the observations in relation to these groups. 
(1) Working as medical doctor 
To this group, we classified those individuals who had a “medical doctor, general 
practitioner”, “medical doctor, specialist doctor” or “medical doctor, dentist” occupation 
code in the Hungarian classification of occupations code system in the given month. Also, 
individuals whose professional code was missing in the observed month, but who had any 
  
medical doctor professional code in the previous month and whose employer was the same 
as in the last month were also classified as working doctors. Those individuals whose 
professional code was missing, but there was at least one month prior to the observed month 
when the individual had medical doctor occupational code, and whose employer belonged to 
the health sector were also classified as the working doctors, as well as those persons who 
were working in the area of health and who had a medical doctor occupational code 
previously, and whose professional code changed to health service manager codes. 
 (2) Out-migrated 
Those Hungarian citizens who sign on abroad have an obligation to notify the authorities 
that they have left the country, but many who out-migrate omit this duty. First, we classified 
to the group of ‘out-migrated’ those who reported their move abroad. We also wanted to 
identify those who have not notified out-migration. So, in addition, in the out-migrated 
group were placed all individuals who for at least four successive months were neither 
registered  as employed in the database of the Pensions Directorate, nor were signed in the 
database of the Health Insurance Fund as being in receipt of inpatient care sickness benefit, 
and who during that period had received neither any other  kind of benefits (unemployment 
assistance, childcare pension, old age pension or other kind of pensions) and at the same 
time  were not registered  as studying in full time education. In other words, the 
classification covered those individuals who ‘disappeared’ from the system. The other 
possible reason for disappearance is that a person who becomes unregistered unemployed is 
practically non-existent among medical doctors in Hungary. So,  it is very likely that using 
the presented method we were able to identify unnotified out-migrated quite well. Further 
restrictions were placed on the process of determining the un-notified out-migrated. Only 
those medical doctors were signed as out-migrated who had worked as a physician or dentist 
in at least three successive months before the ‘disappearance’. Also, we did not sign those 
medical doctors as out-migrated whose ‘disappearance’ lasted exactly from the beginning of 
January until the end of December in a given year and who had worked in the same 
workplace in the months preceding the disappearance as after the return. We assumed that 
the employer failed to report the individual for the given year to the Pensions Directorate in 
these cases. At the same time in the case of some of the omitted observations, the individuals 
in fact might enter employment abroad on a yearly fixed-term contract. Due to these 
restrictions, we give a lower bound estimate on the out-migration. In consequence of the 
procedure of identifying the out-migrated as described above, in the first and last three 
months of the observation period the number of out-migrated is likely to be an 
underestimate, as only the notified out-migrated could be identified in these months.  
  
 (3) Exited the profession (attrition) 
Those observations were classified in this way who did not have a ‘medical doctor’ 
occupation code in the observed month and who had not worked in the health sector or did 
not meet other criteria qualifying them as ‘working as a doctor.' 
 (4) Exited employment 
In this group were placed the unemployed (very few cases, unemployment is practically non-
existent among Hungarian medical doctors), those who were in full-time education, who 
were on a child-care allowance disability pension or retired.   
(5) Died 
We had direct observations for death in our database (in the database of the Health 
Insurance Found).  
3. METHODS 
We analysed the out-migration decisions of doctors with the help of time-to-event analysis. 
We used competing risk models (Fine–Gray, 1999). Doctors may leave the domestic health 
workforce for different reasons: out-migration, a movement to non-health sector 
employment, retirement, child-care leave, etc.  A competing risk is defined as an event whose 
occurrence precludes or alters the probability of occurrence of the main event under 
examination. In our case, the individual either migrates, or goes on to a job outside the 
health sector, becomes inactive or unemployed, or dies.  Competing risk models define 
separate hazard functions for each event . A cause-specific hazard is the immediate 
risk of failure from a particular cause (k) given that failure (from any cause) has not 
happened previously. 
, 
where T is the time to failure from any event. The total hazard is the sum of the sub-hazards: 
, 
where K is the number of competing events. 
We used the Fine & Gray model, which is a modified Cox proportional hazard model that 
allows the presence of competing risks.  The Fine & Gray model makes possible the direct 
modelling of the effects of covariates on the cumulative incidence function via a 
semiparametric approach. Based on the relationship between the hazard and survival 
  
functions, the model defines subdistribution hazards instead of cause-specific hazards. The 
fundamental difference between a cause-specific hazard and the subdistribution hazard is 
the risk set. The subdistribution hazard, hksub (t), is the immediate risk of leaving the 
profession on account of a particular cause, k, given that the subject has not left the job 
before as a result of cause k. 
 
As in the Cox model, the Fine & Gray model for failure is also a relative risk model that 
decomposes into a baseline hazard and the regression effects of covariates: 
, 
where is the baseline subdistribution hazard and is the vector of covariate effects 
(log subhazard ratios). Similarly to the Cox model, the Fine & Gray model makes no 
assumptions about the baseline hazard function and assumes proportional hazards. 
     Based on the predictions of the competing risk model the cause-specific cumulative 
incidence function, gives the proportion of doctors at time t who have left the 
profession for a cause k, accounting for the fact that the job can also be left for other causes: 
 
The total cumulative incidence function is the sum of cause-specific incidence functions:  
 
In the analysis we distinguished four competing risk events: (1) out-migration, (2) exits 
from the profession (attrition), (3) exits from employment (related to inactivity and 
unemployment), or (4) death.  
We conducted the analysis for the whole sample and also for subsamples of four age 
groups. The independent variables were gender, age (in the models that used the entire 
sample), dummy variables indicating whether the individual was a general practitioner or a 
specialist doctor versus a dentist, and dummy variables accounting for the region of 
residence. A further variable verified the relative labour income of the individual, that is the 
average labour income of the person in the preceding three months as a ratio of the average 
national labour income during the same period (calculated from the source sample). To 
determine if the example of peers strengthened out-migration decisions, we included a 
variable indicating if any medical doctors had out-migrated during the preceding three 
months from the same workplace where the individual had been working before migrating. 
This covariate may also reflect the effect of the unobserved differences in working conditions 
  
among different workplaces. We also inserted two dummy variables into the models 
indicating the month of Hungary’s EU accession (05.2004) and another indicating the 
month (05.2011) when the transitional period of restrictions on the free movement of labour 
from EU-8
5
 countries to Austria and Germany ended. 
In order to analyze how the probability of return migration of the out-migrated medical 
doctors may have changed a binary choice Cox proportional hazard model (returning to the 
profession in Hungary or not) was used. In the Cox model, the risk given covariates are the 
product of the baseline hazard and a relative risk.  In this model, the following were included 
as independent variables: gender, age-group dummies and dummy variables indicating 
whether the individual was a general practitioner or a specialist doctor as opposed to a 
dentist. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. WHERE HAVE ALL THE DOCTORS GONE? 
First, we present the cumulative incidence rates of the four competing outcomes based on 
the models for the whole sample (Figure 1). These are the cumulative probabilities of exit via 
each of the competing risk events: out-migration, attrition, exiting employment, and death. 
The probability of leaving the medical workforce due to death is negligible, so we will not 
present detailed results for this outcome in the following. Between January 2003 and 
December 2011, 12% of the practising medical doctors left the country, 17% left the domestic 
health workforce and went to a job outside the health sector in Hungary, and about 14 
percent became inactive (retired, were placed on disability pension or child-care pension or 
became unemployed). A part of this group, those who were in receipt of child-care allowance 
returned to healthcare some time later, the average duration of maternity leave
6
 being 13 
months in the sample. The cumulative incidence functions indicate that attrition contributed 
to doctor shortages even more than out-migration in the observation period. 
                                                 
5 EU-8 countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
6Maternity leave is long in Hungary. New parents are entitled to three years of maternity leave during 
which they cannot be dismissed. Maternity leave qualifies the person taking it to other benefits, 
including pensions. 
  
      Figure 1 
Cumulative incidence functions:  
Out-migration / Attrition / Exit from employment / Death  
 The whole sample 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  Table 1  
Competing risk models (subhazard rates) – out-migration 
Competing risks: attrition/exit from employment/death 
Variable Subhazard rates 
The whole 
sample 
 
<31 years 
old 
 
31-40 
years old 
 
41-50 years 
old  
 
51-60 years 
old 
Gender (Male=1) 1.22* 
(0.058) 
1.37 
(0.164) 
1.49* 
(0.133) 
1.21 
(0.130) 
0.76** 
(0.070) 
Age 0.99* 
(0.002) 
- - - - 
General 
practitioner 
1.33* 
(0.076) 
2.17* 
(0.309) 
1.86* 
(0.182) 
1.39 
(0.225) 
0.82 
(0.123) 
Specialist doctor 1.04 
(0.060) 
0.98 
(0.245) 
1.62* 
(0.163) 
1.21 
(0.141) 
0.83 
(0.079) 
Relative labour 
income 
0.93* 
(0.027) 
0.46* 
(0.074) 
0.68* 
(0.062) 
0.90 
(0.062) 
1.04 
(0.036) 
Peer effect 1.15 
(0.063) 
0.76 
(0.098) 
1.37* 
(0.130) 
1.34 
(0.178) 
1.00 
(0.117) 
Region: 
Central 
Transdanubia 
1.41* 
(0.152) 
1.45 
(0.572) 
1.53 
(0.279) 
1.30 
(0.299) 
1.43 
(0.267) 
Region: 
Western 
Transdanubia 
0.85 
(0.116) 
0.99 
(0.449) 
0.63 
(0.171) 
1.01 
(0.265) 
1.02 
(0.227) 
Region: 
Southern 
Transdanubia 
0.52** 
(0.120) 
0.31 
(0.316) 
0.67 
(0.220) 
0 
(0) 
0.78 
(0.294) 
Region: 
Northern Hungary 
0.75 
(0.094) 
0.40 
(0.235) 
0.90 
(0.179) 
0.52 
(0.161) 
0.86 
(0.188) 
Region: 
Northern Great 
Plain 
1.08 
(0.109) 
2.33* 
(0.581) 
0.82 
(0.151) 
1.08 
(0.223) 
0.85 
(0.178) 
Region: 
Southern Great 
Plain 
0.89 
(0.136) 
1.42 
(0.578) 
0.67 
(0.193) 
1.17 
(0.332) 
0.86 
(0.248) 
EU accession (May 
2004) 
0.51 
(0.159) 
0.00 
(0) 
0.27 
(0.169) 
0.32 
(0.199) 
0.34 
(0.161) 
Lifting of 
temporary 
restrictions (May 
2011) 
5.75* 
(1.029) 
7.65* 
(3.069) 
6.72* 
(2.330) 
4.04** 
(1.848) 
0.00* 
(0) 
Standard errors in parenthesis.  Notes: * significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level.   
Reference category: female; dentist; Central Hungary; month other than 05.2004; month other than 
05.2013   
  
 
 
Table 1 summarises the results of the separate competing risk models for out-migration. 
The first column of the table shows the results for the whole sample; columns 2-5 indicate 
the results for the age-group-specific subsamples. A sub-hazard rate greater than one implies 
a higher probability of out-migration compared to the reference category, while a rate of less 
than one indicates a lower probability. For instance, in the model for the whole sample 
(column 1), the sub-hazard rate for gender is 1.22, indicating that the probability of out-
migration of men is 22% higher than for women. Similarly, a 1% increase in relative labour 
income decreased the probability of emigration by 6% (the sub-hazard rate is 0.94).  
For the whole sample, the results show that EU accession did not change the probability 
of the out-migration of Hungarian medical doctors, but the lifting the Austrian and German 
restrictions on the free movement of labour from EU-8 countries significantly affected the 
probability of Hungarian doctors emigration. For the whole sample, there was a more than 
fivefold increase in the probability of out-migration in May 2011. The results of the age-
specific subsamples show that EU accession affected the probability of out-migration for 
none of the age groups, but the effect of the lifting the Austrian and German restrictions was 
significant for all age groups. The increase in the probability of out-migration was larger for 
the young. There was a more than a sevenfold increase for medical doctors under 31, and 
more than sixfold for physicians and dentists in the 31-40 age bracket. Nevertheless, the 
probability of out-migration of physicians and dentists even in the 41-50 range increased 
fourfold. The effect for the 50-60 group was, significantly zero. In the 31-40 age-group there 
is a significantly higher probablity of men out-migrating than for women. Among the 51-60 
year-olds the probability of out-migration was greater for women than men doctors. In the 
other age-groups, there were no significant differences in the probability of out-migration by 
gender. Relative labour income exercises a significant effect on the out-migration decisions 
of young medical doctors, namely those under 31 years old, as also in the case of the 31-40 
year-olds. In these age-groups, the lower the relative income of a medical doctor, the larger 
the probability of out-migration. For the 31-40 year-olds peer pressure also plays a 
significant role. Medical doctors move abroad with greater probability if any medical doctors 
from the same workplace had out-migrated during the preceding three months. General 
practitioners also move elsewhere with higher probability than the reference group 
(dentists). Regional differences are not typical in the probability of out-migration.   
Changes in the dynamics of the probability of out-migration in the observed period can 
be traced with the help of the cumulative incidence functions. Figure 2 shows the cumulative 
  
incidence functions of out-migration for the different age groups as predicted by the 
competing risk models. 
 
Figure 2  
Cumulative incidence functions – out-migration of medical doctors  
by age groups 
  
  
 
Between 2003 and 2012 more than 14% of  31-40 year-old Hungarian medical doctors 
and dentists left Hungary, 12% of those younger than 31, and 14% even of those in the 51-60 
age group. The group of doctors aged 41-50 shows the lowest rates. Immediately upon EU 
accession, doctors of the oldest age group, 51-60 years, left the country at the fastest pace, 
probably because they could take advantage of their previous professional contacts in finding 
suitable jobs. After that, until March 2010, the outflow of the 51-60 age group stopped. In the 
case of the other age-groups, there was a steady outflow until March 2010: by that date, 8% 
of the 31-40 year-olds, 6% of those younger than 31, and only 3% of those in the 41-50 
groupwent abroad. It was not, however, only the end of the transitional period (May 2011) of 
restrictions on the free movement of labour from EU-8 countries to Austria and Germany 
that increased the probability of out-migration of medical doctors of all age groups: another 
  
turning point may be observed in March 2010. There are several possible explanations for 
this sudden change. It might be the effect of the economic crisis, or the forecast results of the 
upcoming general elections in Hungary in April 2010 that might have contributed to that 
change. In fact, in March 2010, the rise in the outflow was higher than the increase in May 
2011. After March 2010, the probability of out-migration rose steeply not only for the 
younger medical doctors, but also for the 41-50 year-olds as well. The rise of out-migration 
after March 2010 may highlight that not only the pull factors play a decisive role in the out-
migration decisions, but the push factors might be equally important in these decisions. The 
results of the competing risk models for the attrition of medical doctors in Hungary during 
the same period confirm this explanation.  
Figure 3  
Cumulative incidence functions – attrition of medical doctors by age groups 
 
  
  
 
Figure 3 presents the cumulative incidence functions of attrition for the different age 
groups. In the examined period, a larger fraction of young doctors left the health sector than 
that of the older age groups. 18 percent of physicians and dentists younger than 31 years old 
and 20 percent of medical doctors aged 31-40 left their profession and took up another job in 
  
Hungary. During the same period, 14 percent of both the 41-50 and 51-60 years old doctors 
also left the job. In all age groups, a larger proportion of doctors found a job outside the 
health sector in Hungary than that which out-migrated.  
Table 2 summarizes the results of the separate competing risk models of attrition. There 
are no gender differences in the probability of attrition in the whole sample, and for the 
different age groups, but for the 31-40 year-olds. In this age group, women go to a job 
outside the health sector with a significantly larger probability than do men. The probability 
of general practitioners and specialist doctors leaving the profession is smaller than in the 
case of dentists. Relative labour income also has a significant effect on the probability of 
attrition for the whole sample as well as for all of the age-groups. The larger the relative 
income of a medical doctor is the larger the probability is that she/he will go to a job outside 
the health sector even if we control for age, gender, and the other explanatory variables. This 
larger income is probably in large measure the result of more overtime and night duty work. 
Medical doctors who choose to work additional night and weekend shifts to increase their 
salary or who are better paid for other reasons stand a greater probability of leaving the 
profession. It seems that demanding working conditions play a decisive role in attrition 
decisions. For older doctors there might also be other considerations for leaving the 
profession.  Official pay in the Hungarian health sector is low, and even declined during the 
crisis. Medical doctors earn significantly less than graduates with similar education and of 
similar age employed in industry. Although actual labour income including “thank-you 
money” is necessarily higher than customary pay, this extra pay varies widely with age, rank 
and field of practice (Köllő, 2014). Younger doctors usually get small amounts of “thank-you 
money”, while older doctors get much more, but they include only a part of the real amount 
of such payments in their tax statements. In Hungary, there is a uniform mandatory, 
earnings-related public pension system and the hidden income is naturally not counted in 
the income of the individual when the earnings-related pension is calculated. The desire to 
increase their legal income before retirement may harden the attrition decisions of older 
doctors.  
 To obtain a fuller picture of the determinants of attrition it is worth summarizing labour 
income gains of former doctors and looking at where former medical doctors work after 
having left the medical workforce. Table 3 shows the average monthly labour income gains of 
former doctors in the first month after they left the profession and the income benefit as a 
percent of current physicians’ employment income (in December 2011 prices).  The revenue 
gains resulting from job changes are rather high. On average, those medical doctors who left 
the profession enjoyed a 40 percent higher labour income than before the change in job. The 
employment income gain was greater for the older the physicians or dentists. On average, 
  
the pay increase attributable to attrition was about 52 percent for the 50-60 year-olds and 
about 30 percent of the youngest doctors. 
 
Table 2 
Competing risk models (subhazard rates) – attrition 
Competing risks: out-migration/exit from employment/death 
Variable Subhazard rates 
The 
whole 
sample 
 
<30 years 
old 
 
31-40 years 
old 
 
41-50 
years old 
 
51-60 
years old 
Gender (Male=1) 0.89 
(0.036) 
0.77 
(0.083) 
0.67* 
(0.049) 
0.98 
(0.077) 
0.96 
(0.081) 
Age 0.99* 
(0.002) 
-    
General 
practitioner 
0.64* 
(0.034) 
0.59* 
(0.061) 
0.73* 
(0.065) 
0.53* 
(0.071) 
0.41* 
(0.071) 
Specialist doctor 0.62* 
(0.027) 
0.61 
(0.120) 
0.71* 
(0.057) 
0.48* 
(0.038) 
0.64* 
(0.055) 
Relative labour 
income 
1.12* 
(0.014) 
1.56* 
(0.085) 
1.18* 
(0.030) 
1.15* 
(0.027) 
1.10* 
(0.016) 
Peer effect 0.97 
(0.048) 
1.35** 
(0.143) 
0.70* 
(0.068) 
0.87 
(0.090) 
0.97 
(0.111) 
Region: 
Central 
Transdanubia 
0.97 
(0.100) 
0.83 
(0.254) 
0.96 
(0.169) 
0.80 
(0.162) 
1.10 
(0.220) 
Region: 
Western 
Transdanubia 
1.07 
(0.110) 
0.91 
(0.286) 
1.13 
(0.202) 
0.82 
(0.171) 
1.50 
(0.266) 
Region: 
Southern 
Transdanubia 
0.69 
(0.114) 
0.45 
(0.261) 
0.85 
(0.225) 
0.73 
(0.202) 
0.54 
(0.213) 
Region: 
Northern Hungary 
0.75 
(0.079) 
0.95 
(0.242) 
0.68 
(0.134) 
0.59 
(0.122) 
1.08 
(0.203) 
Region: 
Northern Great 
Plain 
0.94 
(0.085) 
0.73 
(0.212) 
0.94 
(0.150) 
0.95 
(0.155) 
1.06 
(0.192) 
Region: 
Southern Great 
Plain 
0.90 
(0.112) 
1.09 
(0.347) 
1.10 
(0.215) 
0.64 
(0.161) 
1.10 
(0.264) 
EU accession (May 
2004) 
0.44 
(0.114) 
0.82 
(0.335) 
0.43 
(0.156) 
0.48 
(0.268) 
0 
(0) 
Lifting of 
temporary 
restrictions (May 
2011) 
4.85 
(0.752) 
0 
(0) 
6.47** 
(2.668) 
1.06 
(0.090) 
9.63 
(6.774) 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Notes: * significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level.  
  
Reference category: female; dentist; Central Hungary; month other than 05.2004; month other 
than 05.2013 
Table 3 
Average monthly labour income gain of Hungarian medical doctors  
in the first month after attrition  
Age group 
Average monthly labour 
income gain 
thousands HUF 
 (in 2011 prices) 
Average labour income gains 
as a % of average labour 
income of medical doctors 
- 30years old 63 553 
30.4 
31- 40 years 
old 68 137 
26.9 
41-50 years old 109 136 
38.8 
51-60 years old 158 226 
51.8 
Total 109 583 39.9 
 
Table 4 summarizes the distribution of former medical doctors who are working outside 
the health sector by sector of employment, and Table 4 by occupation groups after they 
leaving the health sector. A quarter of former doctors finds a job in education and research. 
These jobs are very likely to be connected to the qualification of physicians, and so also more 
or less the jobs in sectors related to pharmaceutical commerce, where 35 percent of former 
doctors work. About 40 percent of former doctors, however, find jobs that have no 
connection with their qualifications.  Very similar patterns can be observed in the 
distribution by occupations of former medical doctors. About 42 percent of them go to 
another job outside the health sector that is not connected with their qualification (Table 5).  
Table 4 
Distribution of former medical doctors by sector of employment  
after attrition (percent) 
 
Sector Percent 
Sectors related to pharmaceutical commerce 35.0 
Education and research 25.0 
Other sectors 40.0 
Total 100 
 
  
 
Table 5  
 
Distribution of former medical doctors by occupation  
after attrition (percent) 
 
Occupation group Percent 
Managerial jobs outside the health sector 18.5 
Occupations related to pharmaceuticals 20.7 
Occupation related to pharmaceutical commerce  18.5 
Other occupations outside the health sector 42.3 
Total 100 
 
Besides out-migration and attrition, leaving employment also contributes – at least 
temporarily – to the growing shortage of medical doctors in Hungary. The greater part of 
medical doctors who became inactive during the examined period did so not primarily as a 
result of retirement, but chiefly that woman medical doctors were  on maternity leave for a 
while (see Annex 2 Table A2 and Figure A1). Although women doctors return to practice on 
average about a year later, the growing feminization of the profession may enhance the effect 
of these absences on medical doctors’ shortages. 
4.2. RETURN MIGRATION 
A part of medical doctors who had left the country during the observation period returned 
some time later. Figure 4 shows the empirical Kaplan-Meier survival functions which 
represent the survival times abroad, that is, the proportion of out-migrated medical doctors 
who are still working abroad a certain amount of time after out-migration. The figure shows 
the Kaplan-Meier curves for the entire sample and also the curves by gender, by age group 
and by the specialisation of the medical doctors. Among medical doctors who left the country 
between January 2001 and December 2011, the average duration of working abroad was 54 
months. In the case of the youngest doctors, those younger than 31 years old, the duration of 
their work abroad was the shortest, on average 42 months. For the 31-40 year-olds and the 
41-50 age group the average duration was 59 months, and for the 51-60 bracket 53 months. 
A possible explanation of why the youngest doctors spent the shortest time in their foreign 
jobs and why the greatest proportion of them returned to the Hungarian health sector is that 
the majority of them left the country for educational opportunities and then they returned 
home after finishing their studies. Of the 41-50 years old out-migrated doctors, about 60 per 
cent were still working abroad after 108 months, and so were about 45 per cent of the 31-40 
  
year-olds and 40 percent of the 51-60 year old doctors. Those doctors might be considered 
permanently out-migrated who are not likely to return to the Hungarian health sector. The 
figure for the whole sample and the gender- and specialisation-specific curves show that the 
unconditional exit rate from the foreign job was quite steady between the 1st and 48th 
months, then between the 49th and 50th month there was a sudden increase in the exit rate, 
and thereafter the exit rate slowed down. The exit rates by gender show that the difference in 
the exit rates was small between the 1st and 50th months. At that point and beyond, a larger 
proportion of women left their foreign jobs than did men. The curves by age groups provide 
an explanation for this. It was the oldest age group, the 51-60 year-olds whose exit rate 
accelerated significantly around the 50th month. It is very likely that a large part of medical 
doctors attaining retirement age return home and work for a while in the Hungarian health 
sector. 
Figure 4 
Return migration of out-migrated medical doctors  
– Kaplan-Meier survival functions 
  
  
 
 
  
Table 6 presents the results of the Cox proportional hazard model of return migration. 
Being male decreases the probability of return migration by 20 percent, as compared to that 
for women. The older the out-migrated doctor is, the smaller is the probability that he/she 
will return. The hazard of return migration is 97 percent smaller for general practitioners 
and 99 percent smaller for specialist doctors than for dentists. There is a 46 percent higher 
probability of the youngest doctors returning home than their counterparts in the other age-
groups, and there is no significant difference in the probability of leaving the foreign job 
comparing 31-40, 40-50 and 51-60 year-old medical doctors. 
Table 6 
Return migration of out-migrated medical doctors 
 - Cox proportional hazard model 
Variable Hazard rate 
Male 
0.82* 
(0.041) 
<31 years old 
1.46* 
(0.104) 
31-40 years old 
1.14 
(0.082) 
41-60 years old 
1.06 
(0.083) 
General practitioner 
0.04* 
(0.008) 
Specialist doctor 
0.02* 
(0.005) 
Number of observations:    187195 
Number of subjects:           2749 
No. of failures:           1713 
Time at risk  :                       187195 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.   
Note: * significant at the 1% level. 
Reference group: female; dentist, 41-50 years old 
 
 
A number of the returning medical doctors may out-migrate again at a later date. In our 
sample, 90 percent of the out-migrated doctors took a job abroad once during the observed 
108 months and only the remaining 10 percent out-migrated twice or more during this 
period. Our results show that about half of the out-migrated doctors are permanent 
migrants.   
  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study show that EU accession did not affect the out-migration of 
Hungarian physicians and dentists, but after Austria and Germany lifted the temporary 
restrictions towards workers from the new EU member states in May 2011, the emigration of 
medical doctors increased considerably. We also found that push factors have as great a role 
in the out-migration decisions of Hungarian physicians and dentists as do pull factors. 
Medical healthcare shortages are not only due to high outward migration but to other 
problems in the Hungarian health system: attrition and feminization. Yet outward migration 
plays an important and growing role in the shortages. The scale of return migration is 
considerable. The Hungarian health system can gain from out-migration only if the 
returning medical doctors can put their increased skills and knowledge to use. If attrition 
and out-migration continue at their former pace, and the facilities remain understaffed, the 
decrease in the quality of care will be difficult to stop. 
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1) Summary statistics of the sample 
Table A1 
Summary statistics 
Variable The whole sample -30 years old 31-40 years old 41-50 years old 51-60 years old 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Male 0.45 0.497 0.39 0.487 0.45 0.497 0.43 0.494 0.45 0.497 
Age 43.38 13.450 -  - - - - - - - 
General practitioner 0.17 0.373 0.30 0.458 0.20 0.403 0.11 0.312 0.11 0.309 
Specialist doctor 0.33 0.471 0.05 0.211 0.31 0.463 0.51 0.500 0.47 0.499 
Dentist 0.07 0.247 0.05 0.227 0.09 0.284 0.07 0.252 0.06 0.241 
Relative labour 
income 
1.66 1.255 1.34 0.801 1.63 1.214 1.80 1.346 1.87 1.311 
Peer effect 0.24 0.429 0.42 0.494 0.25 0.434 0.20 0.399 0.2 0.403 
Region:  
Central Hungary 
0.23 0.422 0.10 0.306 0.26 0.441 0.27 0.443 0.3 0.46 
Region: 
Central 
Transdanubia 
0.03 0.181 0.02 0.126 0.04 0.203 0.04 0.198 0.04 0.201 
Region: 
Western 
Transdanubia 
0.03 0.175 0.01 0.116 0.04 0.184 0.04 0.197 0.04 0.202 
Region: 
Southern 
Transdanubia 
0.02 0.129 0.01 0.094 0.02 0.142 0.02 0.148 0.02 0.131 
  
Region: 
Northern Hungary 
0.04 0.196 0.02 0.148 0.04 0.205 0.05 0.226 0.05 0.216 
Region: 
Northern Great 
Plain 
0.05 0.213 0.02 0.149 0.06 0.239 0.06 0.240 0.05 0.224 
Region: 
Southern Great 
Plain 
0.02 0.152 0.01 0.110 0.03 0.170 0.03 0.174 0.03 0.163 
EU accession (May 
2004) 
0.01 0.097 0.01 0.112 0.01 0.096 0.01 0.098 0.01 0.09 
Lifting of temporary 
restrictions (May 
2011) 
0.01 0.097 0.01 0.071 0.01 0.098 0.01 0.096 0.01 0.102 
28 
 
Annex 2) 
Figure A1 
Cumulative incidence functions – exit from employment of medical doctors by 
age groups and gender 
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Table  A2 
Competing risk models (subhazard rates) – exit from  employment 
Competing risks: out-migration/attrition/death 
Variable 
Subhazard rates 
The whole 
sample 
 
<30 years 
old 
 
31-40 years 
old 
 
41-50 years old 
 
51-60 years old 
Gender (Male=1) 0.36* 
(0.018) 
0.118* 
(0.020) 
0.08* 
(0.010) 
0.41* 
(0.072) 
0.59* 
(0.053) 
Age 1.00 
(0.003) - - - - 
General practitioner 1.62* 
(0.086) 
1.835* 
(0.222) 
1.96* 
(0.173) 
2.79 * 
(0.545) 
0.95 
(0.129) 
Specialist doctor 0.98 
(0.055) 
1.565 
(0.278) 
1.69* 
(0.153) 
1.15 
(0.196) 
0.92 
(0.086) 
Relative labour 
income 
0.74* 
(0.047) 
0.157* 
(0.021) 
0.38* 
(0.045) 
1.16* 
(0.043) 
0.98 
(0.081) 
Peer effect 1.31* 
(0.074) 
1.199 
(0.131) 
1.48* 
(0.127) 
1.08 
(0.216) 
0.72 
(0.093) 
Region: 
Central 
Transdanubia 
1.01 
(0.105) 
1.732 
(0.374) 
0.88 
(0.159) 
0.88 
(0.336) 
0.81 
(0.178) 
Region: 
Western 
Transdanubia 
0.91 
(0.101) 
1.148 
(0.269) 
1.03 
(0.196) 
0.40 
(0.233) 
0.90 
(0.200) 
Region: 
Southern 
Transdanubia 
0.69 
(0.112) 
1.042 
(0.274) 
0.83 
(0.204) 
0.21 
(0.215) 
0.82 
(0.297) 
Region: 
Northern Hungary 
0.83 
(0.084) 
1.259 
(0.232) 
0.97 
(0.165) 
0.34 
(0.173) 
1.06 
(0.197) 
Region: 
Northern Great Plain 
1.02 
(0.089) 
0.758 
(0.161) 
1.05 
(0.150) 
1.04 
(0.308) 
1.24 
(0.211) 
Region: 
Southern Great Plain 
1.10 
(0.131) 
0.805 
(0.269) 
1.56 
(0.295) 
1.14 
(0.451) 
1.10 
(0.269) 
EU accession (May 
2004) 
0.74 
(0.185) 
1.173 
(0.278) 
0.46 
(0.241) 
0* 
(0) 
1.78 
(1.007) 
Lifting of temporary 
restrictions (May 
2011) 
 
 
 
7.49* 
(1.528) - 
4.00** 
(1.894) 
11.92* 
(5.746) 
4.22* 
(1.486) 
Standard errors in parenthesis.  
Notes: * significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level.  
Reference category: female; dentist; Central Hungary; month other than 05.2004; month other than 
05.2013 
 
 
